Duncan Pritchard
Articles
X(2018). Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195 (7), 3065-3077. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4.
(2018). Contextualism and radical scepticism. Synthese, 195 (11), 4733-4750. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1122-0.
with Bondy Patrick (2018). Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification. Synthese, 195 (9), 3811-3820. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1262-2.
(2017). Engel on pragmatic encroachment and epistemic value. Synthese, 194 (5), 1477-1486. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0755-8.
(2012). Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing. Synthese, 189 (2), 255-272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0057-8.
(2009). Defusing epistemic relativism. Synthese, 166 (2), 397-412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9278-2.
with Kallestrup Jesper (2009). Introduction. Synthese, 171 (3), 357-358. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9329-3.
(2009). Wright contra McDowell on perceptual knowledge and scepticism. Synthese, 171 (3), 467-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9328-4.
(2007). Anti-luck epistemology. Synthese, 158 (3), 277-297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7.
(2007). Introduction. Synthese, 158 (3), 273-275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9038-8.
with Neta Ram (2007). McDowell and the new evil genius. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 (2), 381-396.
(2002). McKinsey paradoxes, radical scepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments. Synthese, 130 (2), 279-302. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014421800473.