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In 1904–5, that annus mirabilis for theories of time, in lectures edited by Heidegger in 1928, Husserl prepares the way for Heidegger's demonstration in 1927 that the Aristotelian atomic Now is parasitic upon the diasporatic Augenblick, the moment of vision with its Janus characteristic of looking fore and aft. It is not directly Aristotle's account of time however but Brentano's which is singled out for criticism in the Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. That account is cast in terms of "contents' and is largely psychologistic. Like Hume, according to Husserl, Brentano never gets a firm hold on the difference between psychology and phenomenology. Another weakness Husserl finds is that Brentano limits his account to the temporality of the content of apprehension, ignoring the temporality of the act, thereby throwing away any chance of anticipating Husserl's own distinctions between noetic act, noematic Objekt and real Gegenstand. More seriously erroneous in Husserl's opinion is Brentano's attribution of our ideas of the past and future to the productive imagination. When we listen to a melody we are presented with a content which is the sound of the note being struck now.

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18096-7_2

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