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(1986) Derrida on the threshold of sense, Dordrecht, Springer.
It has been shown in Chapters 1 and 2 that, according to Derrida, Hegel and Husserl turn themselves inside out to found their philosophies on two incompatible principles, a principle of presence and a principle of non-presence. It might be supposed that no such reading of Heidegger would be possible, for in Being and Time he, as he puts it, "destroys' the metaphysics of presence which he maintains is subscribed to by Hegel and Husserl and the metaphysical tradition as a whole. For instance, although he rarely mentions Husserl by name, he holds that phenomenological ontology founded on his principle of all principles is not really fundamental. To start with, it is too narrow. It studies being in terms of consciousness of noematic objects, but this is not the only mode of being. In so far as it attempts to think ontologically it thinks being in terms of present at hand beings, data presented to an intuiting subject. Phenomenology, Heidegger says in the Introduction to Being and Time, must ask not only about the immediate data of consciousness. It must ask also after what conceals itself, the meaning of being, and it must try to bring out why this concealment takes place, why one forgets the ontological difference between being and beings.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18096-7_3
Full citation:
Llewelyn, J. (1986). Fundamental ontological semiology, in Derrida on the threshold of sense, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 32-42.
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