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(2009) Hume on motivation and virtue, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
In many disputes about moral theory appeals are made to the normativity of morality. Sometimes theories are dismissed on the grounds that they fail to account for the normativity of morality. What is meant by such claims? What is normativity, and should it be attributed to morality? Through an examination of Christine Korsgaard's criticism of Humean ethics in The Sources of Normativity, I will argue that there are two distinct notions of nor- mativity in play in contemporary disputes, and hence two different properties which morality may or may not be supposed to possess.
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Full citation:
Russell, L. (2009)., Two kinds of normativity: Korsgaard v. Hume, in C. R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on motivation and virtue, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 208-225.
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