Repository | Book | Chapter

Subjectivity exists. It either is what it claims to be, or it enacts a stage play behind which another type of happening hides. In the first case, its testimony - e.g., that I raise my arm because I will it - is credible at face value; in the second case, it is deceptive, a mere disguise of neurophysiological processes, which parade in the fancy-dress of will but lift the arm without will or the cooperation of will, i.e., they do so irrespective of the presence of a "willing" sensation. The standpoint which grants the psyche its effectiveness stays in agreement with its self-testimony and needs no further reasons; the standpoint which denies its claims must have special reasons for doing so. These reasons, whatever their strength, cannot silence the disputed testimony itself, and thus the natural standpoint, constantly nourished by the subjective evidence, is never abolished in fact. But deprived of the privilege of naiveté, once the question of credibility is raised, it must defend itself against those reasons, since at the serious suspicion of an illusion even its irresistibility ceases to count in its favor. On the other hand, the suspicion must indeed be serious. Thus one must first examine the reasons which here contest the validity of immediate evidence and put naiveté in the role of a theatre-goer who takes the play on the stage for reality.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1473-1_10

Full citation: