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(1991) Existence and explanation, Dordrecht, Springer.

Undefined definite descriptions

Charles Daniels

pp. 39-44

Bertrand Russell [8] and John Bacon [1] argue that definite descriptions are not what they seem — referring terms on a par with names. Instead, they propose contextual definitions which serve to eliminate them. Russell analyses the sentence "the F Gs' as "there is at most one x such that Fx and there is at least one xsuch that Fx and Gx'. Bacon analyses it as "for all x if x uniquely Fs, then Gx. ' In either case all sentences containing definite descriptions are true or false even when there fails to be a unique entity described. For Russell "The present King of France is bald' is false, for Bacon true. Bacon's analysis, in particular, meshes nicely with a feature of generalizations: "All present Kings of France are bald' is also true when there are no present Kings of France.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3244-2_4

Full citation:

Daniels, C. (1991)., Undefined definite descriptions, in W. Spohn, B. Skyrms & B. C. Van Fraassen (eds.), Existence and explanation, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 39-44.

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