Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik

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179019

(1995) Science, mind and art, Dordrecht, Springer.

Hegel's conception of teleology

Myriam Bienenstock

pp. 55-70

Most often, it is in order to answer questions bearing upon the philosophy of action that Hegel's conception of teleology is now examined: many philosophers interested in the nature of action have come to the conclusion that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to account for it in non-teleological, mechanistic terms; and the question thus arises of determining whether Hegel's conception of teleology can be of some use in the endeavour to develop a more satisfactory, alternative explanatory framework for the human and social sciences. Interpreters acknowledge, of course, that Hegel's own discussion of the question took place in a completely different context: his would have been a much more ambitious project, one which seems to have consisted in no less than uncovering the conceptual structure of the world in its totality. Yet his conception might be re-formulated for the human sciences; and all things considered, didn't his own fundamental insight bear mainly upon the philosophy of action, even if it was put in much broader terms?1

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-0469-2_5

Full citation:

Bienenstock, M. (1995)., Hegel's conception of teleology, in K. Gavroglu, J. Stachel & M. W. Wartofsky (eds.), Science, mind and art, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 55-70.

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