Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik

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184097

(2015) The science of subjectivity, Dordrecht, Springer.

Introduction

consciousness, subjectivity, and the history of the organism

Joseph U. Neisser

pp. 1-8

This book is inspired by the deeply historical science of the organism found in contemporary biology. Since P.S. Churchland's Neurophilosophy (1986), "neuro" has become a familiar prefix. Neuroethics, neuroeco-nomics, neuroaesthetics, neurophenomenology and the neurodiversity movement are all contemporary expressions of an intellectual zeitgeist. A neurobiological image of mind and person is emerging, a picture in which we are hide-bound animal subjects, neurologically enabled, ecologically situated, and historically conditioned. But the true philosophical payoff of the newfangled neuroscience remains unclear. What does it contribute, exactly, to our understanding of human experience? In particular, can it really help us understand how anything like a first-person perspective could arise in the world? (Levine, 2001). My answer is yes. The new biology provides real insight into the nature of "for-me" subjectivity and how it is elaborated in the life of an animal. Evolutionary developmental biology offers the framework for an historical account of the way first-person experience arises and how it functions to enable organisms like us to navigate their world. In short, subjectivity is historically conditioned embodiment. In what follows I set forth a philosophical analysis of the first-person perspective, its central place in mental life, and its probable neurobiological basis. My aim is to articulate a conceptually powerful and empirically informed account of subjectivity that will be relevant to audiences across the humanities and life sciences.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9781137466624_1

Full citation:

Neisser, J. U. (2015). Introduction: consciousness, subjectivity, and the history of the organism, in The science of subjectivity, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 1-8.

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