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(2007) Synthese 158 (1).
Embedded cognition and mental causation
setting empirical bounds on metaphysics
Fred Keijzer, Maurice Schouten
pp. 109-125
In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9053-9
Full citation:
Keijzer, F. , Schouten, M. (2007). Embedded cognition and mental causation: setting empirical bounds on metaphysics. Synthese 158 (1), pp. 109-125.
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