Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik
235504

(2013) Synthese 190 (14).

Empirical evidence claims are a priori

Darrell P. Rowbottom

pp. 2821-2834

This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

Full citation:

Rowbottom, D. P. (2013). Empirical evidence claims are a priori. Synthese 190 (14), pp. 2821-2834.

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