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(1986) Frege synthesized, Dordrecht, Springer.
From a natural perspective, Frege's view that sentences denote (bedeuten) objects appears to be an irritating peculiarity. His claim that there are only two objects denoted by sentences and that these are Truth and Falsity has seemed to many to advance from the peculiar to the bizarre. Indeed, a standardized form of philosophical humor has grown up around talk of "naming the True". I think that the natural perspective is sound and that the humor has its point. But understanding Frege's motivations for these views provides insight into the fundamentals of his philosophical standpoint and method. Such insight enriches the natural perspective.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4552-4_6
Full citation:
Burge, T. (1986)., Frege on truth, in L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege synthesized, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 97-154.
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