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In chapter 5 it was noted that the Causality Tenet, CT, is quite general; it applies to any beliefs whatever, such as the causes of belief in the Strong Programme (SP) itself (section 6.4) and the causes of belief in theories of truth (section 6.5). In this chapter we will look at what the general CT has to say about the causes of our belief in principles of inference and the conclusions we draw on their basis. Important here is the influence of Wittgenstein on SP. Advocates of SP claim that logical relations are really social relations of constraint. This is not the truism that social relations of constraint often accompany logical relations (as when we correct one another), but a much stronger claim: they allegedly constitute logical relations. If this is correct, it is a surprising revision of our notion of rationality and what underpins it. Sociologists claim that support for this view-comes from Wittgenstein; in contrast it will be argued there is little support for it in Wittgenstein (given rival interpretations). Barnes and Bloor tell us that there are no universal or absolute justificatory inferences: "…justifications will stop at some principle or alleged matter of fact that only has local credibility … For the relativist there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such" (Hollis and Lukes (eds.) (1982), p. 27). Several consequences of the view that rationality is to be downplayed in favour of mere local acceptance will be examined in this chapter.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0289-9_8

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