Repository | Book | Chapter
(1990) Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Cognitive representations and intentionality and the realism-relativism controversy
Sacha Bem
pp. 267-274
A large part of this paper is devoted to a discussion about the way computationalists inflate internal representations to symbols in the mind. This is partly due to an unhappy fusion of formal (computational) systems and cognition, that is, knowledge in the full sense of the word. It is also a remnant of a form of realism that cannot be accepted. At the end of the paper I suggest, however, that this critique must not lead to the other extreme, relativism. Both sides take language as the heart of cognition. Analyzing intentionality rightly will show that this mental property does not consist only in thinking and speaking but also includes our active involvement in the world.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4613-9688-8_26
Full citation:
Bem, S. (1990)., Cognitive representations and intentionality and the realism-relativism controversy, in M. E. Hyland, W. J. Baker, R. Van Hezewijk & S. J. S. Terwee (eds.), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 267-274.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.