Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik

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(2016) David Hume, sceptic, Dordrecht, Springer.

Epilogue

Hume on the role(s) of philosophy

Zuzana Parusniková

pp. 101-112

For Hume, true philosophy protects us from metaphysics and superstitions; it also shifts our attention from the excessive epistemological scepticism to more rewarding subjects concerned with human behavior in company and affairs, with moral attitudes and social involvement. True philosophy becomes a guide to a balanced, happy life (Hume's version of ataraxia spiced by earthly pleasures), advocates modesty and humility as opposed to dogmatism and fanaticism, and encourages a respect for tradition and customs. However, several questions arise. Does Hume's rejection of (excessive) scepticism on the grounds that it is painful and fatiguing not lead to a demise of critical thinking? Scepticism as the core of criticism should mercilessly scrutinize any phenomena under investigation – it must be excessive to fulfil this function. And further, does Hume's emphasis on easy philosophy not degrade philosophy as such? True philosophers, Hume says, offer views that are natural and obvious and could thus have occurred without the assistance of philosophy; they do not deliver any higher wisdom. What, then, are they for? This anti-elitist and anti-intellectual thrust of Hume's philosophy is unparalleled among his contemporaries

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-43794-1_5

Full citation:

Parusniková, Z. (2016). Epilogue: Hume on the role(s) of philosophy, in David Hume, sceptic, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 101-112.

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