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(2012) Carnap's ideal of explication and naturalism, Dordrecht, Springer.
The bipartite conception of metatheory and the dialectical conception of explication
Thomas Uebel
pp. 117-130
One of the more interesting legacies of the Vienna Circle is a conception of philosophy of science as a second-order discipline comprising both logical and empirical inquiries. Here my aim is, first, to present it; second, to compare this conception of metatheory with the dialectical conception of explication that André Carus, following Howard Stein, attributes to the later Carnap; and, third, to explore some of the issues that both conceptions face.
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Uebel, T. (2012). The bipartite conception of metatheory and the dialectical conception of explication, in Carnap's ideal of explication and naturalism, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 117-130.
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