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(2006) Revisiting discovery and justification, Dordrecht, Springer.
On the inextricability of the context of discovery and the context of justification
Theodore Arabatzis
pp. 215-230
Before the historicist turn in philosophy of science, it was generally regarded that scientific activity takes place within two distinct contexts, the context of discovery and the context of justification. The former consists in the processes of generation of scientific hypotheses and theories; the latter in their testing and validation. According to Reichenbach, who codified the distinction, the context of discovery was the province of historians, psychologists, and sociologists and was not susceptible to logical analysis: "The act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in terms of which a "discovery machine" could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius" (Reichenbach 1951, p. 231). On the other hand, the context of justification was an area which could be rigorously explored and formalized and thus fell within the province of logic and philosophy.2 Popper introduced a very similar distinction in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1968, p. 31). His notion of discovery, however, was different from Reichenbach's (see note 12).
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Full citation:
Arabatzis, T. (2006)., On the inextricability of the context of discovery and the context of justification, in J. Schickore & F. Steinle (eds.), Revisiting discovery and justification, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 215-230.
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