Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik

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(1995) The foundational debate, Dordrecht, Springer.

Strong determinism vs. computability

Cristian Calude , Douglas Campbell, Karl Svozil , Doru Ştefănescu

pp. 115-131

Penrose [40] (see also [41]) has discussed a new point of view concerning the nature of physics that might underline conscious thought processes. He has argued that it might be the case that some physical laws are not computable, i.e. they cannot be properly simulated by computer; such laws can most probably arise on the "no-man's-land" between classical and quantum physics. Furthermore, conscious thinking is a non-algorithmic activity. He is opposing both strong AI (according to which the brain's action, and, consequently, conscious perceptions and intelligence, are manifestations of computer computations, Minsky [35, 36]), and Searle's [47] contrary viewpoint (although computation does not in itself evoke consciousness, a computer might nevertheless simulate the action of a brain mainly due to the fact that the human brain is a physical system behaving according to (computable) mathematical "laws").

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3327-4_9

Full citation:

Calude, C. , Campbell, D. , Svozil, K. , Ştefănescu, D. (1995)., Strong determinism vs. computability, in W. Depauli Schimanovich, E. Köhler & F. Stadler (eds.), The foundational debate, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 115-131.

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