Repository | Book | Chapter
(1986) Annals of theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer.
A distinction has to be drawn between the concept of belief and the concept of acceptance. Even though the English words belief and acceptance may not have sufficiently uniform uses to carry the whole weight of the distinction, at least they ought not to be used interchangeably in this context: the underlying differences in conception are quite important. The main points to be noted are as follows, but further consequences are explored in Cohen (1983a).
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_26
Full citation:
Cohen, L. , Cohen, J. (1986)., An ambiguity in Egan's concept of belief, in L. Mos (ed.), Annals of theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 365-367.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.