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(2014) Interdisciplinary works in logic, epistemology, psychology and linguistics, Dordrecht, Springer.
Geometry as a measurement-theoretical a priori
Lorenzen's defense of relativity against the ontology of its proponents
Oliver Schlaudt
pp. 21-43
Lorenzen rejects ontological commitments of relativity. Realism of physical geometry already breaks down with Poincaré's arguments. Lorenzen agrees with Poincaré, but offers a constructive account: space is not an empirical entity described by means of conventions , but a purely constructive entity constituted by the norms of spatial measurement . This space however, as Lorenzen argues, is Euclidean. In this paper, we shall analyse Lorenzen arguments and explicate how they relate to arguments from empiricism and neo-kantianism. It will be shown that the originality of Lorenzen's position consists in systematically accounting for the role of measurement and measurement instruments.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-03044-9_3
Full citation:
Schlaudt, O. (2014)., Geometry as a measurement-theoretical a priori: Lorenzen's defense of relativity against the ontology of its proponents, in M. Rebuschi, G. Heinzmann, M. Musiol & A. Trognon (eds.), Interdisciplinary works in logic, epistemology, psychology and linguistics, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 21-43.
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