Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik
229217

(2019) Human Studies 42 (3).

Self-stigma, bad faith and the experiential self

Karl Eriksson

pp. 391-405

The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals' identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following a phenomenological account, the stigmatized self can thus return to a state-of-being, similar to that Jean-Paul Sartre once referred to as bad faith. Regarding your identity as analogous to an inanimate thing is ultimately self-deceptive. Self-stigma is here phenomenologically illuminated as constituted by basic discretion, that is, as a minimal form of agency. The study found that basic discretion can uphold the possibility for emancipation from a stigmatized self.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10746-019-09504-8

Full citation:

Eriksson, K. (2019). Self-stigma, bad faith and the experiential self. Human Studies 42 (3), pp. 391-405.

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