Netzwerk Phänomenologische Metaphysik

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202109

(2014) Educational research, Dordrecht, Springer.

The tractarian template in the representation of educational research

can we ever depart from the picture of logical empiricism?

Paul Smeyers

pp. 97-114

The chapter starts from a discussion of two recent educational research articles and asks in what sense what they argue for really needs empirical evidence. It characterizes these educational research debates as embracing a weak version of positivism which prioritizes referential meaning in their endeavour to present the "world-as-it-is". As such studies come close to a particular reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus it is then asked in what sense the Tractorian picture which gives ammunition to logical positivism/empiricism and or post-positivism can be avoided. But it is also questioned how these studies would do if one really looks at them as examples of the stance of the Tractatus. Starting from Wittgenstein's claims and arguments in this work, it is argued that even if one would embrace this stance to justify theoretically what it is that the dominant strand of educational research is doing or can do nowadays, such justification would not work as it would betray what the Tractatus makes itself abundantly clear (i.e., the nature of the pictorial form). It is then questioned whether the limitation that the Tractatus sets itself (i.e., that in a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses) should not be transgressed in a more radical way than its author already does. So how about if we take the nature of the pictorial form seriously and start (in ethics, etc.) from "This strikes me as the right way of putting it". How would this be different from an expression where it is said that the table stands next to something else? It is argued that what social scientists do is not fundamentally different. In coming to this conclusion it is crucial to appreciate that one pictures facts to oneself, that a picture is a model of reality, which agrees with reality or not, bearing in mind that what is real necessarily refers to "what is real for us". Educational research presupposes that what is the case administers a normative background and generates aims which have to be observed and aspired at any cost. The illusion of certainty that these researchers uphold is very attractive, almost irresistible to all those who struggle to decide what to do, but is yet another manifestation of scepticism. It cannot do away with the normative stance they themselves are necessarily embracing as researchers. Their forgetfulness of the pictorial form is at odds with the position they seem to embrace. Of course, it may never be completely or totally possible to diverge oneself from one or other kind of correspondence theory of truth. Once one accepts, however, that there is theoretical knowledge one needs to realize that more is at stake which can no longer be captured by a correspondence theory of truth, and from this it follows that more and different kinds of "what makes sense to say" have to be "admitted". Such broadening can build on a thin conception of meaning (may even always necessarily build at least partly on this), but offers richer perspectives. This rational debate cannot be passed over in silence. But neither can the temptation to ask for evidence—some justice needs always to be done to what is perceived by the senses which can never be completely bracketed.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-03083-8_7

Full citation:

Smeyers, P. (2014)., The tractarian template in the representation of educational research: can we ever depart from the picture of logical empiricism?, in P. Smeyers & M. Depaepe (eds.), Educational research, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 97-114.

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